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McNALL Y v. UNITED STATES: INTANGIBLE
RIGHTS MAIL FRAUD DECLARED A
DEAD LETTER
Congress enacted the federal mail fraud statute (mail fraud statute or
Act)' in 1872,2 during a period that witnessed a general expansion of federal
authority into areas of the law previously within the sole jurisdiction of the
states.3 Despite the historical significance of the development of federal ju-
risdiction that the mail fraud statute represented, its legislative history is
sparse.4 The sponsor of the new act envisioned it as frustrating the fraudu-
lent designs of "thieves, forgers, and rapscallions"5 who effected their
schemes by use of the federal mails. Beyond those remarks, however,
neither more specific aims of the new law, nor relevant committee discus-
sions, were recorded.
The Act originally proscribed the use of the mails to implement any
"scheme or artifice to defraud," 6 but did not remain long in this relatively
1. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1982)) [hereinafter mail fraud statute or Act]. Section 1341 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obli-
gation, security, or other article . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for
mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Ser-
vice ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned ....
Id.
2. Although part of a general recodification of the postal laws, § 301 was without legisla-
tive predecessor. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771, 779
(1980); Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions Under
the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHL L. REV. 562, 567 (1980).
3. This Reconstruction Era expansion of both federal civil and criminal law in part was
due to a proliferation of large scale swindles and frauds with which state authorities were
unable to contend. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 780.
4. Virtually every commentator to discuss the mail fraud statute agrees on this point.
See, e.g., Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 423, 425-26 (1983); Morano, The Mail Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J.
MAR. L. REV. 45, 45 n.2 (1980); Rakoff, supra note 2, at 782-83; Note, Survey of the Law of
Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L. REv. 237, 239 (1975).
5. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
6. The Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)) provided, in relevant part:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
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simple form. In 1889, Congress engrafted a list of prohibited schemes onto
the original language by using the disjunctive "or."' 7 Thus, the revised act
prohibited both schemes and artifices to defraud as well as certain named
schemes or artifices to obtain money, including "sawdust swindles" and
"counterfeit money fraud."'
Congress amended the statute again in 1909.9 The vague prohibition of
schemes and artifices to defraud remained, this time linked directly by the
disjunctive "or" to the new phrase "for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."'
Consequently, after the 1889 and 1909 revisions, the statute appeared to pro-
hibit use of the mails in connection with two different activities: undefined
schemes to defraud, or schemes to obtain money or property by fraud."
Clearly, these amendments enlarged the operation of the new law,' 2 yet they
passed through Congress without any illuminating legislative history. 3
Thus, the further expansion of a statute originally representing a novel ex-
defraud, or be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or
communication with any other person... by means of the post-office establishment
of the United States ... shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or at-
tempting to do so), place any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States,
or take or receive any therefrom, such person, so misusing the post-office establish-
ment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Id
7. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1982)). The amended act provided, in relevant part:
If any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away ... or procure for unlawful use
any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank notes, paper money, or any obligation or se-
curity of the United States ... or ... what is commonly called the "sawdust swin-
dle," or "counterfeit money fraud," or by dealing or pretending to deal in what is
commonly called "green articles,". "green coin," "bills," "paper goods," "spurious
Treasury notes," shall, in and for executing such scheme ... place or cause to be
placed, any letter ... in any post-office ... shall .. .be punishable by a fine ....
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See id.
9. The amended act provided, in relevant part: "Whoever, having devised or intending
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ... shall be fined .... " Act of Mar.
4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1085 (1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
909 (1974). But see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 298 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (statutory construction rules require that all parts of a statute be construed to-
gether, wherever possible).
12. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 772-73.
13. See id. at 809 (1889 amendment); id. at 816 n.205 (1909 amendment).
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tension of federal authority took place without recorded explanation.,
4
However, even this early broadening of the statute's scope could not fore-
shadow modem developments in the law of mail fraud, which commentators
suggest began about 1941.'"
In that year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sug-
gested in dicta' 6 that the corruption of a public fiduciary constituted a
scheme to defraud prohibited by the mail fraud statute.17 The following
year, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts simi-
larly suggested, in dicta, that the corruption of a private fiduciary relation-
ship was also a fraudulent act within the mail fraud statute.'" Both cases
implied that, even absent an acquisition of money or property,' 9 the mere
corruption of a fiduciary relationship, where a mailing was involved, consti-
tuted a scheme to defraud in violation of the mail fraud statute. Thus, the
cornerstones of the doctrine of "intangible rights"20 mail fraud were set.2 '
What followed was a gradual but dramatic judicial extension of the
mail fraud statute as a proscription of both public and private sector
intangible rights fraud.22  Thus, a law of rather obscure origins and
14. This was not unusual for that time. The United States Code Congressional and Ad-
ministrative News, for example, a major regular compilation of legislative histories and other
congressional materials, was not even introduced until 1941.
15. See, e.g., Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fi-
duciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
117, 128-30 (1981); Hurson, supra note 4, at 428-30.
16. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 574 (1942).
17. Id.
18. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1942).
19. This aspect of both decisions is most provocative, because the mail fraud statute is in
essence a false pretenses statute, and false pretenses is a crime that traditionally required that
the victim sustain a loss of money or property. In this regard, see infra text accompanying
notes 50-60.
20. Prosecutors in the United States Attorney's office in Chicago, while that office was
directed by James R. Thompson, the present Governor of Illinois, apparently first coined the
term "intangible rights." See Coyle, US. Prosecutors Reel in Wake of Mail Fraud Ruling, 9
Nat'l L.J., July 20, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
21. Courts upholding the intangible rights doctrine have relied on both Proctor and Gam-
ble and Shushan. See infra notes 104-08, 141-47, and accompanying text.
22. So dramatic, in fact, that by 1987 every federal circuit in the country had considered
and accepted the intangible rights theory. See, e.g., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754,
758-59 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987); United States v. Girdner, 754 F.2d
877, 880 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1343 (1lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
1988]
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design23 became a versatile prosecutorial weapon,24 extremely popular with
United States attorneys. 25 The general contours that the intangible rights
doctrine ultimately assumed can be described simply: A public or private
fiduciary who conducts a self-serving scheme, advanced by some incidental
use of the mails, by refraining from disclosing material information, has
committed mail fraud by depriving those who had trusted him of their intan-
gible rights to his good and honest services. Under the pure intangible rights
mail fraud doctrine, it was not necessary that those defrauded sustain a loss
of money or property.26
This development did not go unnoticed. For years, commentators,27
scholars, 28 and jurists29 have questioned the legal validity of the doctrine.
Finally, after repeatedly denying certiorari to affirmed mail fraud convic-
tions, a° the United States Supreme Court, in McNally v. United States," de-
cided whether the federal mail fraud statute criminalizes intangible rights
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7, 8 (4th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976);
United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(mail fraud statute a stopgap device that contends with new frauds not otherwise covered by
other, more particularized, statutes).
25. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 771. Mr. Rakoff himself is a former United States attor-
ney. He described the mail fraud statute with glib enthusiasm:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradiva-
rius, our Colt 45., our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love. We may
flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy statute "darling," but
we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adapta-
bility, and comfortable familiarity.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Hurson, supra note 4, at 423 (advancing statistics in support of
claim that the mail fraud statute has become the premier weapon in the Justice Department's
battle against white collar crime).
26. See, e.g., States, 488 F.2d at 764; accord United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 784 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 2, at 564; Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected
State Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U.L.
REV. 63, 66-77 (1978).
28. See Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189, 234-42 (1985); Morano, supra note 4, at 76-81.
29. See States, 488 F.2d at 767 (Ross, J., concurring); see also United States v. Margiotta,
688 F.2d 108, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
30. Virtually every defendant whose conviction for intangible rights mail fraud was af-
firmed at the federal appellate level requested certiorari. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta,
688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. States, 488
F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974). Prior to McNally v. United States,
107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), the Supreme Court denied all requests. See, e.g., supra note 22.
31. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
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fraud. Reasoning that congressional intent behind the statute was arguable
at best,32 and applying the statutory construction rule of lenity,33 the Court
concluded that the mail fraud statute does not protect "the intangible rights
of the citizenry to good government.",
3 4
Petitioners Charles McNally and James Gray participated in a simple
kickback scheme. Gray and Howard "Sonny" Hunt35 were officials in the
Kentucky state democratic party. Hunt had authority over selecting the
agencies through which the commonwealth would purchase its insurance.
36
Hunt arranged for the commonwealth to purchase its worker's compensa-
tion policies through one particular insurance agency.37 In return, the
agency agreed to dispense commissions on the account in excess of fifty
thousand dollars to other companies Hunt designated. 38 The beneficiary
companies included one that Gray and Hunt controlled,39 and that Mc-
Nally, a private individual, nominally owned. McNally also received addi-
tional excess commission payments at Hunt's direction.'
McNally and Gray were tried before the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky on charges of mail fraud and conspiracy.4"
The government argued, consonant with established intangible rights fraud
principles, that the defendants had defrauded the government and citizenry
of Kentucky of the good and honest services of their public servants.42 The
court accepted the theory and charged the jury that it need only find that the
defendants exercised control over state insurance selection processes and
that the defendants directed the payment of commissions to a company in
which they held an undisclosed interest.43 Based on those instructions, the
jury convicted both men of mail fraud and conspiracy.' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing with approval the
32. Id. at 2880.
33. Id. at 2881.
34. Id. at 2879.
35. Hunt pled guilty to a single count of intangible rights mail fraud. United States v.
Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1292 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct.
2875 (1987).
36. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877-78.
37. Id. at 2877.
38. Id.
39. In fact, the two organized Seton Investments, Inc. for the sole purpose of sharing in
the profits generated by their illicit arrangement. Id. at 2878.
40. Id
41. Id. at 2875.
42. Id. at 2878.
43. Id. at 2878-79.
44. Id.
1988]
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intangible rights doctrine as articulated by other circuits.4"
The United States Supreme Court reversed46 and held that the district
court's jury charge was erroneous because it permitted convictions for acts
outside of the reach of the statute.47 Justice Stevens wrote a four part dis-
sent, parts one through three of which Justice O'Connor joined. 48 Justice
Stevens contended that the mail fraud statute did indeed prohibit schemes
involving only intangible rights fraud because Congress intended the statute
to prevent abuse of the mails.49
This Note will examine the legal history relevant to the McNally decision,
analyze the decision itself, and discuss its ramifications. Specifically, the
Note first will review the enactment, substantive revisions, and early inter-
pretations of the mail fraud statute. The Note then will chronicle the mod-
em expansion of the doctrine of intangible rights mail fraud and review the
antithetical rule of lenity. Against this background of mail fraud law, the
Note will analyze McNally by juxtaposing the respective views of the major-
ity and dissent. Predictions as to the decision's impact will follow. Finally,
the Note will conclude that, although McNally invalidated a versatile
prosecutorial theory, it admits the possibility that alternate theories will mit-
igate its impact. Consequently, McNally represents a practical compromise
between the two extremes of distended federal criminal jurisdiction and fed-
eral powerlessness over corrupt fiduciaries.
I. INTANGIBLE RIGHTS MAIL FRAUD: BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENT,
AND THE COMPETING RULE OF LENITY
A. The Law of Fraud when Congress Enacted the Mail Fraud Statute
Fraud in nineteenth century American jurisprudence5" was a creature of
both the common law and statute,5 ' manifest in various distinct crimes.52
All such crimes of fraud were, in essence, crimes against property imple-
45. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1294-95, 1298 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nam.
McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
46. A strong majority of seven, including Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Scalia, voted for reversal. McNally, 107 S.
Ct. at 2877.
47. Id. at 2882.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2884-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. For a concise but thorough examination of this topic, see Comment, supra note 2, at
572-78.
51. See id. at 572.
52. Specifically, these crimes included embezzlement, false pretenses, forgery, and larceny




mented through trickery or deceit.53 One of these, false pretenses, consisted
of three basic 54 elements: (1) specific intent to defraud, (2) the advancement
of a false pretense, and (3) pursuant acquisition of money or property.
55
Throughout the nineteenth century and into this century, nearly every
court to consider the fraud of false pretenses adhered to the traditional re-
quirement of an acquisition of money or property from the victim.
56
Although courts occasionally relaxed the requirement that the victim sustain
an economic loss," in every known case the victim nonetheless transferred
money or property to the defendant.5"
Congress enacted the mail fraud statute, and completed its substantive
amendments, during this period.59 In fact, the statute reads like, and has
been treated as, a false pretenses statute.' Because it is unlikely that Con-
gress disregarded the then current elements of a crime that it was prohibit-
ing, it follows logically that, in enacting the mail fraud statute, Congress
intended only that it protect property rights, rather than the relatively ethe-
real right to a fiduciary's uncompromised loyalty.6 '
53. See Comment, supra note 2, at 573; see also Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 420 n.43 (1959) (common law fraud is the obtaining of prop-
erty by deceitful or illegal practice).
54. For a more detailed breakdown of the elements of fraud as identified by various courts
see Goldstein, supra note 53, at 420 n.43.
55. See Comment, supra note 2, at 574 n.71.
56. Id. at 574. But see Tyner v. United States, 23 App. D.C. 324, 362-63 (1904) (corrupt
conduct by a postal official may cause "general damage" that is fraud in an "equitable" sense,
even though it causes no pecuniary loss).
57. See People v. Bryant, 119 Cal. 595, 597, 51 P. 960, 961 (1898); LaMoyne v. State, 53
Tex. Crim. 221, 229, 111 S.W. 950, 953 (1908). In both cases, the defrauded victims sustained
no actual economic loss, but the courts affirmed the convictions of both defendants because
each had fraudulently induced their victims to part with money or property.
58. See Bryant, 119 Cal. at 596-97, 51 P. at 961; LaMoyne, 53 Tex. Crim. at 225-26, 111
S.W. at 951; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2; see also infra notes 62-93 and accompanying
text.
60. See Comment, supra note 2, at 573-74.
61. Notwithstanding the solid authority behind this synopsis of the law of fraud when
Congress enacted the mail fraud statute, the Seventh Circuit took a contrary position on the
question shortly before McNally was decided. In United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th
Cir.), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987), the court considered whether a judge commits mail fraud
when he solicits loans from counsel for a party before him but conceals that information from
opposing counsel and the public. Id. at 307. Answering in the affirmative, Judge Posner
suggested that one is guilty of common law fraud simply by withholding material information
in violation of a fiduciary duty. Id. at 307-08. Judge Posner cited no authority in support of
his proposition but seemingly took it on faith that a fiduciary's simple nondisclosure of infor-
mation, absent an acquisition of money or property, constituted common law fraud.
Nor does it follow that Judge Posner's view is supported, by analogy, by broad constructions
of "to defraud" in federal conspiracy cases. In several such cases, see, e.g., Hammerschmidt v.
United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); Curley v. United
1988]
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B. Legislative History and Early Interpretations of the Mail Fraud Statute
1. The Statute's Enactment
Although congressional attempts to control the illicit use of the federal
mails first crystallized in 1868,62 Congress did not enact the lineal ancestor
of the modern mail fraud statute until 1872.63 The sponsor of the new legis-
lation stated that it was needed "to prevent the frauds which are mostly
gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions gener-
ally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the
country."
64
This express legislative concern with preventing fraud assumed the shape
of the statutory prohibition of any "scheme or artifice to defraud." But the
Act further required that the fraudulent scheme be effected with an intent to
use the mails and an actual use of them.65 This dual proscription, of fraud
States, 130 F. 1 (1st Cir. 1904), courts found fraud where no property rights deprivation had
occurred. As the Curley court correctly recognized, however, such an expaisive explication of
fraud under the federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), which makes it a crime to
defraud the United States government in any manner) is justified by that statute's singular
nature. See Curley, 130 F. at 6-10.
In Curley, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed a conviction
under the conspiracy statute where the fraudulent act involved no acquisition of money or
property (James Michael Curley, not yet governor of Massachusetts, sat for a post office en-
trance exam under another man's name). The court noted that the word "defraud" as used in
common law statutes that protected individual and community property rights referred to
frauds of money and property. Id. at 6-7. The court added that such a statute, protecting only
individual/community property rights, is "one thing," while a statute directed at protecting
the government alone, "might be quite another." Id. at 7. Along these lines, the court rea-
soned further that the government may safeguard itself against acts that compromise only its
operations by declaring such acts unlawful. Id. at 9. Then, following this reasoning to its
logical conclusion, the court held that an act of fraud that merely impairs government opera-
tions without compromising property rights was within the conspiracy statute. Id. at 10.
The point of Curley is clear. A broad construction of the conspiracy statute is justified
because the smooth administration of the government itself can be gravely disrupted by deceit
whether or not the government is defrauded of money or property. Consequently, the Ham-
merschmidt, Haas, and Curley cases merely hold that the offense of defrauding the government
requires no proof of a property loss, while they imply that that same requirement in the con-
text of a law protecting individual property rights, like the mail fraud statute, remains appro-
priate. These cases, therefore, appear not to lend support to Judge Posner's view of common
law fraud in general and mail fraud in particular.
In fact, the Supreme Court confirmed this reading of the law shortly after McNally. On
appeal, the Court vacated defendant Holzer's conviction and remanded his case for further
consideration in light of McNally. See Holzer v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 53, 53 (1987).
62. The "lottery law" of 1868 made it unlawful to use the mails to advance certain illegal
lotteries and circulars. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 196; see also Rakoff,
supra note 2, at 781-82.
63. See supra note 6 for the text of the amendment.
64. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 6; see also Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895) (mail
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and mail misuse, imparted an inherent tension to the infant law, because it
was unclear whether Congress was concerned with controlling fraud gener-
ally, or with preventing abuse of the postal system. 66 Not surprisingly, the
scarcity of legislative history67 did little to mitigate the statute's ambiguity,
which soon thereafter became manifest in contradictory decisions by the
lower federal courts.6' The Supreme Court considered the Act twice in this
early period, each time resolving only technical issues of procedure.69
2. The 1889 Amendment
In 1889, in response to judicial uncertainty,7' Congress revised the origi-
nal statute by engrafting onto it an itemized list of prohibited offenses.7
This was done by adding the disjunctive "or," followed by the new language,
several phrases after the phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud."' 2 The
result was that, in addition to undefined schemes to defraud, the statute also
expressly prohibited defined schemes of property fraud.73 No legislative his-
tory accompanied this amendment, 74 and two Supreme Court decisions that
soon followed indirectly offered contradictory interpretations of its effect.
In Streep v. United States,75 the trial court convicted the defendant of one
of the property crimes the mail fraud statute expressly prohibited, selling
counterfeit money through the mails.76 On appeal, he argued that the trial
court's jury charge was erroneous because it did not require that the jury
find a scheme to defraud in addition to a scheme to sell counterfeit obliga-
tions.77 In rejecting his argument, the United States Supreme Court noted
that the statute applies either to a scheme to defraud, or to a scheme to sell
fraud consists of three elements: scheme to defraud, intent to implement scheme through the
mails, and use of the mails).
66. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 783-85.
67. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
68. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 790-806 (lower federal courts divided into two camps in
construing mail fraud statute, broad and strict constructionist).
69. See In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372 (1889) (resolving question as to sentencing aspects of
statute); United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888) (resolving question as to sufficiency of
indictment).
70. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 809.
71. See supra note 7 for the text of the amendment.
72. Id.
73. Id. In addition, Congress added the phrase "caused to be placed" to the language
describing use of the mails in execution of the scheme. Thus, it no longer was necessary that
the defendant himself place the letter in the mail, an indirect mailing sufficed. Id.
74. See supra notes 4, 14, and accompanying text.
75. 160 U.S. 128 (1895).
76. Id. at 132.
77. Id
1988]
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counterfeit money."' Beyond that, the Court did not elaborate. 79 Conse-
quently, Streep implies that the 1889 revision prohibited two different types
of crimes. However, the Court in no way conceptually distinguished the two
proscribed schemes or otherwise suggested that one referred to crimes of
property while the other did not.8 °
The following year, in Durland v. United States,8 ' the Court confronted a
case in which the defendant was charged with mail fraud for selling through
the mails bogus bonds, none of which he intended to honor.82 The question
presented was whether the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud" included
frauds effected by false promises as to the future, or was limited to misrepre-
sentations as to past or present facts.8 3 The Court held that even fraudulent
misrepresentations as to the future were proscribed schemes to defraud, and
expressly refused to limit the use of the mail fraud statute to cases involving
only misrepresentation of past or existing facts.8 4 Because defendant Dur-
land obtained money by his fraudulent acts,85 the Court's holding implied
that "schemes to defraud" broadly applies only in similar cases involving
pure property rights fraud. The Court did not address, however, the amend-
ment's grammatical separation of unidentified schemes to defraud from spe-
cific property crimes, leaving uncertainty as to whether the Court considered
Durland's acquisition of money necessary to its conclusion.
3. The 1909 Amendment
In 1909, Congress again amended the mail fraud statute8 6 by codifying the
Durland conclusion that the law encompassed false promises in addition to
misrepresentations as to past or existing facts.8 7 However, the revision had
an additional practical effect that the Durland Court apparently did not in-
tend. The new statute retained and emphasized by rearrangement" the
78. Id. at 132-33.
79. Id.
80. In fact, the Court summarily dismissed the appellant's question in one paragraph. It
seemed to view the argument as semantic only, a question of nomenclature rather than sub-
stance. See id.
81. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
82. Id. at 312.
83. Id. at 313.
84. Id. at 313-14.
85. Id. at 312.
86. See supra note 9 for the text of the amendment.
87. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 980 (1953) (concluding that
the 1909 amendment codified Durland).
88. Compare the 1889 version, supra note 7, with this version, supra note 9. After 1909,
the language referring to money or property followed directly after "or" rather than several
clauses later, as in the 1889 version.
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grammatical distinction between schemes to defraud and schemes to obtain
money or property that the 1889 Amendment had first suggested. Thus, the
first sentence of the statute prohibited "schemes or artifices to defraud or
[schemes] to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises."
89
In addition, Congress deleted original language dictating that the pro-
scribed schemes had to be "effected by opening or intending to open corre-
spondence." 90 In this way, Congress discarded the element of scienter with
respect to use of the mails required by the 1889 version.9 The result was a
streamlined law essentially stripped of language that originally had empha-
sized the federal aspect of the crime: misuse of the mails. 92 Therefore, it is
not surprising that the statute received a jurisdictional challenge not long
thereafter.
93
In Badders v. United States,94 the trial court convicted the defendant of
using the mails for the purpose of executing an undisclosed scheme to de-
fraud.93 He challenged his conviction on the grounds that the amended law
only incidentally implicated a federal concern-mail abuse-while regulat-
ing schemes that otherwise were beyond federal jurisdiction.96 Justice
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, flatly rejected the defendant's con-
tention. After holding that Congress did have the right to regulate the
"overt act" of posting a letter,97 he added: "[Congress] may forbid any such
[use of the mails] done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary
to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not." 8 The Badders
Court thus seemed to place its imprimatur on the mail fraud statute as an
antifraud provision limited in scope only by federal definitions of public pol-
icy.99 The Badders Court did not, however, directly construe the language
89. See supra note 9.
90. Id.
91. The Supreme Court acknowledged this chahge in United States v. Young, 232 U.S.
155, 161-62 (1914).
92. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 816.





98. Id. (citing In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1891)); cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819) (relatively broad federal authority over the mails inferred from
terse constitutional grant of postal power).
99. Although there is precedent at common law for the proposition that the law pros-
cribes conduct tending only to corrupt the public morals, see Jones v. Randall, 98 Eng. Rep.
706, 707 (1774) (the law prohibits whatever is bonos mores est decorum), the Supreme Court
recognized long before Badders that there are no common law crimes in federal jurisprudence.
Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
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of the mail fraud statute or specifically define what constituted a "scheme or
artifice to defraud."' o
C. The Intangible Rights Doctrine
Although a form of intangible rights fraud is nearly as old as the mail
fraud statute itself, '0' the more provocative doctrine of intangible rights mail
fraud did not begin to take shape until about 1941.102 From that point, it
developed in two separate but parallel directions, private and public sector
intangible rights mail fraud.'° 3
1. Private Fiduciary Intangible Rights Mail Fraud
In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., ' the government charged the
defendant with mail fraud in connection with a scheme to bribe the employ-
ees of a competing business in exchange for trade secrets. 105 Unquestiona-
bly, the information that the defendant illicitly obtained had economic
value. ' 6 In rejecting the defendant's contention that the government's in-
dictment had failed to state an offense, however, the court made the unneces-
sary observation that one who purposefully induces a breach of the
employer/employee relationship defrauds the employer of a "lawful
right."' 7 This early articulation of the theory of intangible rights mail
fraud proved seminal,' 0 8 but did not win immediate acceptance.
PROBS. 64, 64 (1948). Consequently, Justice Holmes' broad language, as well as similar proc-
lamations in more recent mail fraud cases, see, e.g., Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671
(1967) (stating that the law condemns conduct that fails to reflect "moral uprightness"), would
seem to authorize an overextension of federal jurisdiction.
100. For a brief discussion in this regard, see Comment, supra note 2, at 580. After the
1909 Amendment, Congress amended the mail fraud statute three times. All three amend-
ments were minor language revisions. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763,
763 (surplusage from 1889 version removed); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 34, 63 Stat. 94,
94 ("dispose of" replaced "dispose or"); Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375,
§ 60)(11), 84 Stat. 719, 778 (1970) ("postal service" replaced "post office department").
101. See, e.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910); Curley v. United States, 130 F. i,
10-11 (1 st Cir. 1904) (holding that "to defraud" under the conspiracy statute need not include
an acquisition of money or property).
102. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574
(1941); United States v. Procter & Gamble, 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1942).
103. For a brief discussion of this parallel development, see Hurson, supra note 4, at 428-
31.
104. 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
105. Id. at 678.
106. Id. at 679. The court expressly rejected the argument that the purloined secrets had
no intrinsic value. Id.
107. Id. at 678.
108. Federal courts have relied on Procter & Gamble many times for the proposition that
the mail fraud statute protects intangible rights. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d
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In Epstein v. United States, 109 the codefendants, directors simultaneously
of breweries and brewery supply companies that did business with each
other, were charged with mail fraud." 0 The government's theory was that
the defendants' undisclosed conflict defrauded the respective corpora-
tions. 11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the defendants' breach of fiduciary duty fell short of "actual" fraud." 2 The
court reasoned that the defendants had contracted at arms length, that the
agreements were mutually advantageous, and that they were made in good
faith.' 3 Having concluded that the defendants were guilty of no more than
"constructive" fraud, the court reversed the convictions." 4
Epstein, however, represented only a brief slowing of momentum for the
private fiduciary intangible rights doctrine."' Beginning in 1973 and con-
tinuing through 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit repeatedly outlined the contours of the doctrine; in the process, the
court rejected the constructive fraud defense."
6
In the first of these cases, United States v. George, 117 the defendant
purchased cabinets for Zenith Radio Corporation." 8 In that capacity, he
agreed with the cabinet supplier that he would refrain from soliciting other
suppliers in exchange for a "kickback" payment of one dollar per cabinet." 9
After confirming the requisite use of the mails, the court concluded that the
761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 997, 1012 (D. Md. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), conviction
aff'd in relevant part en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980).
109. 174 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1949).
110. Id. at 756.
111. Id. at 763.
112. Id. at 766-69.
113. Id. at 766-70.
114. Id. at 770. For a brief discussion of Epstein and the constructive fraud defense, see
Morano, supra note 4, at 60-63.
115. The Epstein court was not, however, the last court to resist intangible rights mail
fraud. In United States v. Kelem, 416 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952
(1970), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in dicta
that the mail fraud statute must be strictly construed so as to avoid extension of federal law
beyond the limits Congress defined. Id. at 347.
116. See United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
977 (1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149-50 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 827 (1973). For a discussion of each case, see Morano, supra note 4, at 65-71.
117. 477 F.2d at 508.
118. Id. at 509-10.
119. Id. at 510. The defendant's agreement directly contravened an express company con-
flict of interest policy. Id. at 511.
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defendant's scheme defrauded Zenith of his loyal and faithful services.' 2 °
The court reasoned that the defendant's failure to solicit competitive cabinet
suppliers, and to inform Zenith that the supplier might accept a smaller
profit, constituted a duplicitous compromise of Zenith's right to the defend-
ant's loyal service.1 2 '
Two years later, in United States v. Bryza, '2 2 a similarly situated defend-
ant also was convicted of intangible rights mail fraud.' 2 3 Defendant Bryza
was a purchasing agent for International Harvester Company. 24 In viola-
tion of the company's express conflict of interest policy, Bryza accepted
kickbacks from several parts suppliers.' 2  The Bryza court followed the rea-
soning of the George court in affirming the defendant's conviction.
2 6
Bryza's failure to disclose his interest in his corrupt arrangement, the court
held, deprived International Harvester of the honest and faithful services of
a fiduciary. 127  In both George and Bryza, the defendants raised, and the
court rejected, the constructive fraud defense.'
28
In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit contin-
ued the intangible rights trend in a novel context. In United States v.
Louderman, 129 the court affirmed the wire fraud' 30 convictions of the opera-
tors of a collection agency. 3 ' The government's theory was that, by misrep-
resenting themselves over the telephone to debtors in order to obtain
personal information, the defendants defrauded the debtors they pursued of
intangible privacy rights. 132 The court agreed, and deemed the practice a
proscribed scheme to defraud phone company patrons of their right to
120. Id. at 513-14.
121. Id.
122. 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976).
123. Id. at 415-16.
124. Id. at 415.
125. Id. at 415-16.
126. Id. at 422. In fact, the Bryza court relied expressly on George. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Bryza, 522 F.2d at 422-23; United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 n.5 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
129. 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
130. The wire fraud statute is identical to the mail fraud statute, except for the requirement
that the scheme to defraud be implemented by an interstate or international wire, rather than
mail, communication. It provides, in relevant part: "Whoever, having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication .... 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). Not sur-
prisingly, the courts have identically construed the wire fraud and mail fraud statutes. See
Note, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94
YALE L.J. 1427, 1429 n.8 (1985).
131. Louderman, 576 F.2d at 1386.





Juxtaposition of Louderman with George and Bryza illustrates the steady
expansion of the intangible rights theory. The defendants in both George
and Bryza violated express conflict of interest policies. 134 Further, in both
George and Bryza, arguably the defendants defrauded their employers of
money as well as the intangible interest in employee loyalty. 13  In
Louderman, on the other hand, no prior relationship of any kind existed
between the parties, and no property interests of any kind were
compromised. 136
These decisions constitute merely a representative sampling of a very
broad category of similar cases recognizing private fiduciary intangible
rights mail fraud. 137  In each case, contrary to traditional concepts of
fraud, 138 and notwithstanding the absence of direct Supreme Court or com-
mon law precedent, 139 courts upheld mail fraud convictions of defendants
who had obtained nothing of value from their "victims." Simultaneous with
this development, courts employed the same reasoning and reached the same
conclusions in the area of public fiduciary intangible rights mail fraud."4
2. Public Fiduciary Intangible Rights Mail Fraud
Commentators cite Shushan v. United States, 141 as initiating the modem
development of intangible rights mail fraud by public fiduciaries.142 The co-
defendants in Shushan, including a member of a local parish levee board
whose complicity was secured by a bribe, set up and executed a bond scheme
133. Id.
134. See United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 510-11, 514 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 827 (1973).
135. For example, the one dollar kickback per cabinet in George, which the defendant
pocketed, might well have translated into a reduced price for the defendant's company had
there been no such deal. In Bryza, the same argument applies; the defendant pocketed what
might otherwise have been a cost reduction for the employer.
136. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d
7 (4th Cir. 1979), is a similar case. There, the defendant deprived women of their privacy by
seducing them, through false promises of acting jobs, and delivering no services. Id. at 8. The
court affirmed his wire fraud conviction. Id. at 9.
137. Prior commentators also have discussed these cases. See, e.g., Hurson, supra note 4,
at 429; Morano, supra note 4, at 65-67.
138. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
139. Id. Also, recall that Procter & Gamble, often cited as the first modern private fiduci-
ary intangible rights mail fraud case, only articulated the doctrine in dicta in the context of a
case involving a tangible property loss. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 47 F. Supp. 676,
678-79 (D. Mass. 1942).
140. See infra notes 141-71 and accompanying text.
141. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
142. See, e.g., Hurson, supra note 4, at 429-30; Comment, supra note 2, at 584-85.
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
through which they obtained usurious fees at the expense of the same
board. 143 In holding the defendants guilty of mail fraud, the court noted
first that the government charged the defendants with scheming to defraud
the levee board of money.'" At this point, a common law or even nine-
teenth century court probably would have found that the government had
stated all elements of the crime of fraud, and affirmed on that basis.'4 5 In
this case, however, the court grounded its decision on the theory that, by
corrupting the fiduciary obligation the bribed board member owed to the
board, the defendants deprived the public of its right to honest govern-
ment.146 This dicta ultimately assumed a life of its own as the holding of
later cases.
147
-In 1969, another mail fraud case further defined the public fiduciary the-
ory. 148 In United States v. Faser,'49 the defendant was the executive secre-
tary of the Governor of Louisiana. 50 In exchange for bribes, the defendant
directed the deposit of state funds to a particular bank.' 5 ' The government's
indictment sounded the traditional charge that the defendant defrauded the
state of money and property.15 2 The court essentially restated Shushan, 153
however, when it rationalized the defendant's conviction on the additional
ground that a state employee could commit fraud in such a case simply by
depriving the state of his loyal and faithful services. 54
Four years later, in United States v. States,155 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit elevated this fiduciary fraud rationale from
dicta to holding.' 56 In States, the court affirmed a mail fraud conviction
143. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 114-15.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth century definition
of fraud).
146. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 115.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
909 (1974).
148. See United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1969).
149. Id
150. Id. at 382.
151. Id at 381-82.
152. Id.
153. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574
(1941); see also supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
154. Faser, 303 F. Supp. at 384-85. The court relied on Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d
665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) in this regard. Faser, 303 F. Supp. at 385.
155. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
156. Coffee, supra note 15, at 166 n.215, considers the States decision as the point after
which broad acceptance of the intangible rights doctrine became manifest. However, at least
one post-States court refused to accept the pure intangible rights theory. See United States v.
Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on rehearing, 680 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.
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based on the defendants' participation in a ballot box stuffing scheme.' 57
Citing the seminal Procter & Gamble and Shushan cases,158 the court de-
clared that the prohibition of "schemes or artifices to defraud" properly is
considered independent of the "for obtaining money or property" phrase. 59
From there the court concluded that the defendant had committed such a
fraud simply by depriving the citizens of Missouri and the Board of Election
Commissioners of "intangible political and civil rights.
'' 60
After States, the pure intangible rights theory that that court had articu-
lated gained wide acceptance.' 6' For example, the theory supported widely
publicized convictions of several powerful political figures.' 62 One in partic-
ular merits discussion because it represents another growth marker beyond
which the reach of the public fiduciary theory passed.
In United States v. Margiotta, 163 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the mail fraud conviction of Joseph Margiotta,
the Republican Party Chairman of both Nassau County, Long Island and
the Town of Hempstead, Long Island. 4 Margiotta was a private individ-
ual, but he was intimately involved in local politics.1 6  For years, he ap-
pointed local insurance agencies to secure insurance for the town and
county.' 66 In return, he directed commission payments to political associ-
1982). Another court limited the theory by finding no violation of the mail fraud statute where
the defendant's acts did not injure the government that employed him and did not affect his
performance as a state representative. See United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1024-26
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
157. States, 488 F.2d at 767.
158. Id. at 764.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 765. Thus, States departed altogether from the traditional requirement that a
crime of false pretenses be attended by an acquisition of money or property, because, at com-
mon law, intangible civil rights had no intrinsic economic value. Cf Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 258-59 (1978) (no analogue at common law for compensatory damage award due to depri-
vation of procedural due process).
161. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 166 n.215 (noting general acceptance of theory after
States); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (theory accepted by every federal
circuit).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.) (Governor of Maryland's
conviction affirmed), aff'd in relevant part on reh'g en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.)
(codefendant Otto Kerner was the former Governor of Illinois), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
163. 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
164. Id. at 113.
165. In fact, although Margiotta held no elective office, he maintained a political "strangle-
hold" over the respective governments of Nassau County and the Town of Hempstead. Id. at
122.
166. Id. at 113-14, 127.
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ates.1 7 The court reasoned that the defendant had involved himself in gov-
ernmental affairs to such an extent as to justify recognition in his case of the
duty of fiduciary responsibility formerly applied only in cases involving des-
ignated political officials.168 Therefore, like actual public officials before
him,169 defendant Margiotta suffered affirmation of his conviction for de-
priving the citizens within his jurisdiction of his honest and faithful
services. '
70
Margiotta disturbed some observers, who saw its broad interpretation of
mail fraud as a blanket authorization for federal prosecutions limited only by
the discretion and imagination of United States attorneys.' 7 ' But Margiotta
did not emerge from a vacuum. As the preceeding survey demonstrates,
Margiotta represented a legal trend of nationwide proportions. Against the
backdrop of this trend, consideration of the rule of lenity will place the Mc-
Nally decision fully in context.
D. The Rule of Lenity
It cannot be gainsaid that the United States Supreme Court possesses the
power to "say what the law is.' 172 Nor can it be doubted that the Supreme
Court has long and often held that, in exercising that power, it will strictly
construe ambiguous 173 penal statutes.' 74 This rule of lenity, as it is called, is
most commonly applied where a federal penal statute criminalizes certain
poorly defined conduct, and the question presented the court is whether the
defendant's actions fall within that category of criminal conduct.'
7
5
Where such criminal conduct is defined sufficiently, however, and con-
167. Id. at 118-19, 127.
168. Id. at 121-22.
169. Id. at 121 (listing cases involving mail fraud convictions of public officials).
170. Id. at 113.
171. See Hurson, supra note 4, at 432, 436; see also Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 139 (Winter, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The majority's use of mail fraud as a catch-all
prohibition.., creates a real danger of prosecutorial abuse for partisan political purposes." Id
172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); cf United States v. Kimbell
Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979) (Court's function is to put congressional policy into effect).
173. A genuine statutory ambiguity must precede application of this rule. See, e.g., Hud-
dleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831-32 (1974); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,
596 (1961).
174. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1985) (quoting United States v. Wilt-
berger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)).
175. See generally Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the "Rule of Lenity" in the
Construction of Criminal Statutes, 62 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1981). The judicial practice of strictly
construing penal statutes began in England during the eighteenth century. At that time, a
proliferation of crimes designated capital offenses by Parliament encouraged courts to read
criminal laws very strictly, so as to save relatively minor offenders from the gallows. See
Jeffries, supra note 28, at 198 n.23.
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gressional purpose is clear, the rule of lenity will not frustrate that pur-
pose. 176 Consequently, the Supreme Court has declined to apply the rule in
several cases where, after an examination of the statute's language 177 and
legislative history, 178 it found no genuine ambiguity.
179
The rule of lenity is primarily informed 80 by the related doctrines of no-
tice and separation of powers.' 8 ' Where notice requires that penal laws
clearly apprise the public of what acts are deemed criminal, the rule of lenity
ensures that unclear laws operate very narrowly.182 In the same way, where
separation of powers deems lawmaking the responsibility of legislators and
law interpreting that of the courts, the rule of lenity restrains courts from
effectively reading unintended meaning into ambiguous statutes. 183
Although commentators had suggested the incongruity of the coexistence of
the rule of lenity and intangible rights mail fraud,184 the problem received no
more than a nodding judicial acknowledgment 8 5 until it finally was taken
up by the Supreme Court.
176. See Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 832.
177. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) (absent clear
legislative intent, statutes interpreted according to the plain meaning of the language).
178. See Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (court may rely on
legislative history in construing inexact statutes). See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes
§§ 294-306 (1974) (discussing rule of lenity and related principles of statutory construction).
179. See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1979) (Travel Act unambiguous
as applied); United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978) (Hobbs Act unambiguous as
applied).
180. In addition to the concepts of notice and separation of powers, discussed infra at notes
181-83 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court also has identified federalism as an under-
pin of the rule of lenity, because unbridled constructions of federal statutes could infringe upon
the jurisdiction of state law. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
181. See Jeffries, supra note 28, at 199-200. Jeffries notes that, in addition to these princi-
ples, respect for the "Rule of Law" also encourages jurists to exercise discretion in reviewing
statutes. Id. at 212-22.
182. Id. at 205-12.
183. Id. at 202-05.
184. See Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Study of the "Evolution" of
a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 5-7 (1983); cf Comment, supra note 2, at 574
(implying that application of rule of lenity would be inconsistent with modern constructions of
the mail fraud statute).
185. In United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983), for example, the majority recognized that a broad mail fraud rule could criminalize a
large category of conduct, id. at 122, but then affirmed defendant Margiotta's conviction by
giving the mail fraud statute "a more sweeping interpretation" than any other court before it.
Ia at 139 (Winter, J., dissenting). Likewise, in United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), the fact that Judge Ross was troubled by the court's
construction of the Mail Fraud Statute did not prevent him from concurring in the opinion.
See id. at 767 (Ross, J., concurring).
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II. MCNALLY V. UNITED STATES TWELVE CIRCUITS REVERSED
In McNally v. United States, ' 86 the United States Supreme Court directly
construed the problematic language of the mail fraud statute for the first
time. 117 Writing for the majority,' 88 Justice White held that jury instruc-
tions that required no finding that the alleged victims of mail fraud were
deprived of money, property, services due, or control over their money, erro-
neously permitted convictions for conduct beyond the scope of the mail
fraud statute.' 89 In short, the Court ruled that frauds by public officials
compromising only intangible, that is, noneconomic rights, are not mail
fraud. 190 By so holding, the Court resolved uncertainties as to the construc-
tion and operation of the statute that had lingered since its enactment. '9' At
the same time, the Court reaffirmed the long-standing rule of lenity that the
modem growth of intangible rights mail fraud had belied.' 92
Justice White focused first on the legislative history of the statute's enact-
ment. 193 After noting the remarks of the Act's sponsor, 94 he concluded
that the sparse legislative history indicated that the law was directed at pro-
tecting the public from schemes to obtain money or property.'95 Thus, Jus-
tice White forecast the Court's holding at the outset.
Justice White turned then to the Court's decision in Durland v. United
States. 196 In his view, Durland simply held that the phrase "scheme or arti-
fice to defraud" was to be construed broadly as to property rights fraud. 97
In this regard, Justice White noted that the Durland Court construed the
mail fraud statute to reach not only schemes to defraud based on false repre-
sentations as to the past or present, but also frauds effected by "suggestions
and promises as to the future."' 9 8
186. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
187. Id. at 2879-8 1. Though the Court had construed the statute generally before, see Dur-
land v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896); Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128 (1895), Mc-
Nally is the first instance in which the Court conducted a focused examination of the statute's
two core phrases.
188. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, and Scalia. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877.
189. Id. at 2882.
190. See id. at 2879.
191. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 790-806 (discussing widely divergent interpretations of the
original mail fraud statute).
192. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
193. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879-80. See generally supra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text.
194. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
195. Id.
196. 161 U.S. 306 (1896); see also supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
197. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
198. Id. at 2880 (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896)).
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From this position, Justice White reasoned that the 1909 codification of
Durland further emphasized that Congress intended the statute to protect
only property interests.199 However, noting the disjunctive separation of the
statutory prohibitions of schemes to defraud from schemes to obtain money
or property, Justice White conceded the possibility that Congress intended
that the two phrases be considered separately.2°° Consequently, he under-
took a brief discussion of the verb "to defraud.,
211
In this regard, Justice White first stated that "to defraud" commonly
means wronging one in a property right by depriving one of something of
value by deceit.20 2 Nothing about the 1909 amendment, he continued, indi-
cated that Congress was ignoring that common understanding.20 3 He con-
cluded that Congress' addition of the second phrase ("or for obtaining
money or property") only made it unmistakable that the law proscribed mis-
representations as to the future, in addition to other frauds of money or
property. 2°
Justice White moved next to the rule of lenity.2° ' In accord with that
rule, he noted that harsh interpretations of criminal statutes are appropriate
only where Congress has spoken clearly. 2°6 Then, suggesting that any other
construction would only involve the federal government in setting disclosure
and good government standards for state and local officials, 207 Justice White
reiterated the Court's conclusion that the mail fraud statute protects only
property rights.20 8
Justice Stevens, in a relatively lengthy dissent joined as to parts one
through three by Justice O'Connor, initiated his remarks by stating his sim-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2880-81. See generally supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
law of fraud when Congress enacted the mail fraud statute).
202. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880-81. Ironically, Justice White cited Hammerschmidt v.
United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924), for support, which stands for the seemingly contrary posi-
tion that no such property rights deprivation need occur where a conspiracy to defraud the
federal government is charged. See id.; see also supra note 61. But under another view, Justice
White noted, while fraud under the conspiracy statute need not involve an interference with
property, fraud under a property rights-protecting law-like, by implication, the mail fraud
statute-is "quite another [thing]." Id. at 2881 n.8 (quoting Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1,
7 (1st Cir. 1904)). Thus, Justice White left no doubt as to the inapplicability of conspiracy
decisions like Hammerschmidt in defining mail fraud, even as he cited Hammerschmidt for a
general proposition regarding common law fraud.
203. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
207. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
208. Id.
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ple thesis; the mail fraud statute is a broad prohibition of any scheme or
artifice to defraud. 2" In support of this position, Justice Stevens briefly sur-
veyed the areas in which various circuit courts of appeals had read the mail
fraud statute as prohibiting intangible rights fraud.2"' He asserted that
neither the words nor purpose of the statute justified the majority's limiting
interpretation of it.2 1'
Next, Justice Stevens directed his attention to the language of the statute.
Proclaiming himself "at a loss" to understand the basis of the majority's
holding,2" 2 he simply contended that the statute's disjunctive separation of
schemes to defraud from those to obtain money or property made it obvious
that one could violate one without necessarily violating the other.21 In sup-
port of his contention, Justice Stevens suggested a comparison with Streep v.
United States,2 14 apparently for its implication that schemes to defraud are
conceptually distinct from counterfeiting schemes involving the theft of
money.21 ' However, he made no attempt to argue that Streep held that the
mail fraud statute criminalized two separate types of fraud.
Justice Stevens asserted next that Congress' purpose in enacting the stat-
ute was to prevent misuse of the mails.216 In this respect, he cited Justice
Holmes' broad mail-misuse language from Badders.217 Justice Stevens con-
tinued by asking pointedly if, in enacting the mail fraud statute, Congress
was willing to tolerate fraudulent infringement of the right to honest politi-
cians and government while it prohibited fraudulent deprivation of
money.218
In addition, Justice Stevens argued that broad constructions of "to de-
fraud" in the context of federal conspiracy cases should be "virtually dispos-
itive here." '2 19 In support of this contention, he posited that Congress
enacted both statutes at about the same time,22° suggesting that Congress
209. Id. at 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2883-84 nn.1-5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co.,
93 U.S. 634, 638 (1876) (quoting Gyger's Estate, 65 Pa. 311, 312 (1870)) (strict adherence to
technical rules of grammar should not defeat "common sense" interpretation of statute).
214. 160 U.S. 128 (1895).
215. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text.
216. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). But note that, in the process, Justice Stevens disregarded
the fact that the 1909 Amendment divested the mail fraud statute of its mail emphasizing
language. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
218. McNally, 107 S. Ct. 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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intended "to defraud" to mean the same thing in each instance. But after
acknowledging that, unlike the mail fraud statute, the plain language of the
conspiracy statute clearly authorizes broad application, he weakly submitted
that, "in any event," the phrase from the mail fraud statute "scheme or arti-
fice to defraud" is expansive.22" '
Justice Stevens then directed his attention to ways in which scholars and
the appellate courts had defined and construed "to defraud." He cited sev-
eral dictionary definitions generally contemporaneous with the enactment of
the mail fraud statute that spoke of fraud in broad terms of deceit and depri-
vation of rights.222 In addition, he quoted Judge Posner's unsupported
dicta22 3 from the subsequently vacated Holzer224 case to the effect that com-
mon law fraud includes the simple concealment of material information in
the context of a fiduciary duty.225 Justice Stevens summed up his construc-
tion of "to defraud" by arguing that the absence of contrary indications in
the statute's legislative history, combined with Congress' general expansion
of the statute by amendment, indicated that the broad scope afforded mail
fraud by the federal circuit courts was appropriate.226
Justice Stevens next attacked the majority's application of the rule of len-
ity.227 Repeated acceptance of the intangible rights doctrine by the courts of
appeals, he argued, "removed any relevant ambiguity" from the statute.228
Such a judicial validation, he contended, in addition to the fact that the de-
fendants certainly knew that their scheme was unlawful, made for a
"strange" application of the rule of lenity.229
In essence, Justice Stevens rested his arguments against the majority's
construction of "to defraud" and use of the rule of lenity on the combined
conclusions of the circuit courts of appeals in accepting intangible rights
mail fraud.230 He offered no Supreme Court decisions or additional evidence
of any significance to challenge the majority's premise. Although no one
would dispute Justice Stevens' implicit argument that kickback and other
such schemes are deserving of criminal sanction, he failed to advance any
policy that would counter the majority's unwillingness to authorize federal
221. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See supra note 61.
224. Holzer v. United States, 816 F.2d 304, 307-08 (7th Cir.), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987).
225. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2888-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2889-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 2889-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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involvement in setting state disclosure and good government standards
through an expansive construction of the mail fraud statute.
Finally, dissenting alone in part four, Justice Stevens suggested means by
which the majority decision might be limited.2"' First, he noted that Con-
gress simply could negate the decision by amendment.2 32 Second, he rea-
soned that some corrupt officials might still be prosecuted for mail fraud
simply because, by depriving their employers of their loyalty, corrupt public
fiduciaries also deprive them of services for which they are receiving com-
pensation.233 Third, Justice Stevens suggested that the agency rule under
which a disloyal agent must deliver any proceeds of his disloyalty to his
principal could operate to satisfy the majority's requirement that mail fraud
liability be based on a taking of money or property. 234 Notwithstanding
these possibilities, Justice Stevens concluded solemnly, the majority's deci-
sion will immunize many types of fraudulent mail use from prosecution.235
III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF McNALLY
Already, McNally has proven itself an extremely provocative decision.
Federal prosecutors concede that it has struck a devastating blow at the
prosecution of public corruption, 236 that it will generate appeals, 237 and that
it will require the reevaluation of pending mail fraud cases.238 Some mail
fraud scholars have approved the decision, 239 others have condemned it. 240
Legislation to overturn McNally is before a House committee on criminal
justice;241 legislation to amend its anticipated effects is before the Senate
231. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Regarding the efforts of two legislators to follow
this suggestion, see infra notes 241-42.
233. Id. at 2890 n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra note 271 and accompanying
text (noting a post-McNally order implicitly supporting this theory).
234. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra note 270 and
accompanying text (noting two post-McNally decisions supportive of this theory).
235. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Cf Coyle, U.S. Prosecutors Reel in Wake of Mail Fraud Ruling, Nat'l L.J., July 20,
1987, at 1, col. 1.
237. See id. at 36, col. 3. So far, courts have vacated several mail fraud convictions in light
of NcNally. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 876 (D. Md. 1987); Ingber v.
Enzor, 664 F. Supp. 814, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But see United States v. Callanan, 671 F.
Supp. 487, 494 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (denying habeas corpus relief on grounds that McNally is
not retroactive in collateral attacks).
238. Coyle, supra note 236, at 1, col. 1.
239. Id. at 36, col. 1.
240. Id. at 36, col. 2.
241. See H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Congressman John Cony-
ers for purpose of amending United States Code to include intangible rights in the definition of
"fraud" wherever it appears). At this writing, H.R. 3089 is before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, which has yet to act upon it.
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Rules and Administration Committee.24 2 Beyond these immediate reac-
tions, however, the projected impact of the McNally rule, in several areas, is
reasonably certain.
A. McNally and Private Fiduciary Intangible Rights Fraud
Private sector fiduciaries charged with mail fraud will argue that Mc-
Nally's reasoning regarding public fiduciaries applies equally to their cases.
Such efforts probably will succeed. In both the public and private sector
contexts, the theory is predicated on the deprivation by a fiduciary of his
cestui's intangible right to the fiduciary's uncorrupted services.24 3 There-
fore, whether the fiduciary is a public servant or private individual is imma-
terial when, as McNally indicates, the mail fraud statute does not protect the
compromised intangible right.2 " As it does those in the public trust, Mc-
Nally should immunize many private fiduciaries from mail fraud prosecu-
tion under the intangible rights doctrine.24 5
B. McNally and Wire Fraud
The wire fraud statute246 is patterned after the mail fraud statute and
courts have construed it identically with respect to intangible rights fraud.24 7
Consequently, to the extent that McNally bars certain intangible rights mail
fraud prosecutions, it should preclude further application of the doctrine of
intangible rights wire fraud as well.24
242. See S. 1837, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Senator Mitch McConnell
for purpose of clearly defining and strengthening federal authority over government corruption
and election fraud). At this writing, the Rules and Administration Committee has not acted
upon S. 1837.
243. See supra notes 104-70 and accompanying text (discussing intangible rights theory in
both public and private sector forms).
244. In fact, the Supreme Court has remanded the mail fraud conviction of a private fiduci-
ary for further consideration in light of McNally. See United States v. Price, 788 F.2d 234 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom. McMahan v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 3254 (1987).
245. McNally will not protect, however, private fiduciaries trading securities on nonpublic
information. In that context, the Court has deemed such confidential information a property
interest that is protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes. See Carpenter v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987). Although Carpenter rested any doubts raised by McNally as to the
continued vitality of mail and wire fraud prosecutions of corrupt securities traders, it really
adds little that is new to the McNally rule. In fact, the Carpenter conclusion that the cestui's
right to exclusive use of his information is protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes, id. at
320-21, essentially restated the McNally Court's articulation of the same theory. See McNally
v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 (1987) (absence of charge that fraud victim be deprived
of control over its money was one reason why mail fraud jury instructions were erroneous).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); see also supra note 130 (quoting relevent text of the statute).
247. See Note, supra note 130, at 1429 n.8.
248. To date, at least three wire fraud convictions have been reversed in light of McNally.
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C. McNally and Bank Fraud
Congress modeled the language of the federal bank fraud statute249 di-
rectly after the language of the mail fraud statute.250 In light of McNally,
the bank fraud statute cannot be construed to protect intangible rights any
more than the mail and wire fraud statutes can.251
D. McNally and the Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act,25 2 among other things, prohibits any interference with
commerce by extortion.253 The statute defines extortion as the obtaining of
property from another person by any of several specified inducements. 254 In
recent years, however, ignoring legislative history indicative of a contrary
congressional intent, 255 courts have relaxed the Act's "property" require-
See United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Herron, 825
F.2d 50, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. 11 1984). Section 1344 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly execlites, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice-(l) to
defraud a federally chartered or insured financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of
the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by or under the
custody or control of a federally chartered or insured financial institution ....
Id.
250. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 377, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3517, 3519 (bank fraud statute modeled on mail and wire fraud statutes, which
reach a "wide range" of activity).
251. Although Congress patterned the bank fraud statute after the mail fraud statute, it did
not address the potential for an intangible rights dimension to the bank fraud statute. It fol-
lows, therefore, that Congress did not intend its enactment of the bank fraud statute implicitly
to endorse judicial reliance on the intangible rights mail fraud theory. Nevertheless, one com-
mentator has suggested that Congress already had given the intangible rights doctrine its tacit
assent. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 123 n.34.
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982). Section 1951 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the move-
ment of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this sec-
tion shall be fined ....




255. To all appearances, Congress did not intend that the Hobbs Act protect noneconomic
interests. The bill's sponsor, for example, submitted that "[r]acketeering ... is a fraudulent
scheme or unlawful method to gain money or other transferable materials." 89 CONG. REC.
3218 (1965) (statement of Rep. Hobbs). Another representative described robbery under the
Act as "the taking of tangible property away from some person, or things from persons .... "
91 CONG. REC. 11,920-21 (1969) (statement of Rep. LaFollette). These remarks are represen-
tative of recorded congressional views on the proposed Act.
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ment and deemed it satisfied by the deprivation of an intangible right.256 In
this respect, the Hobbs Act has operated in much the same way as the mail
fraud statute had before McNally. 
257
In light of this pre-McNally symmetry of statutory application, it is prob-
able, for two reasons, that McNally effectively will reduce the reach of the
Hobbs Act, or at least confine it to its present scope. First, the McNally
Court's deflation of the pure intangible rights mail fraud theory directly
challenges the underpinnings of the intangible property rights theory under
the Hobbs Act.25 Second, the McNally Court reemphasized the judicial
duty strictly to construe ambiguous penal statutes; and arguably, the Hobbs
Act is an ambiguous statute.259 Accordingly, courts should proceed with
caution in this area.
E. McNally and RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 26 is a
unique part of the federal criminal code in that it creates no new offense.
Rather, it prohibits patterns of illegal activity as defined by twenty-four sep-
arate crimes.26 ' Mail fraud, wire fraud, and Hobbs Act violations are all
predicate crimes under RICO.262 To the extent that McNally narrows in
scope the several predicate offenses discussed above, it likewise narrows the
256. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d
267, 278 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d
1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
257. In fact, prior to McNally, the two laws experienced nearly parallel judicial expansion
as anti-corruption provisions. Cf Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study
in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977) (discussing use of Hobbs
to prosecute local corruption in the federal courts).
258. Like the intangible rights mail fraud doctrine, the theory of intangible property rights
under the Hobbs Act arguably is contradicted by the Act's legislative history. See supra note
255 and accompanying text.
259. Evidence of this ambiguity exists in the fact that judges and legislators have taken
manifestly conflicting views on the statute. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
260. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982) [hereinafter RICO]. Section 1961 provides, in relevant part:
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other danger-
ous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provi-
sions of title 18, United States Code: ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section
1343 (relating to wire fraud) . . .. section 1951 (relating to interference with com-
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operation of RICO.
2 61
F Alternate Prosecutorial Practices After McNally
The McNally majority's distinction between the conspiracy and mail fraud
statutes2 ' indicates that an intangible rights theory remains viable where a
scheme to defraud the federal government itself is provable. This distinction
could provoke increased reliance on the conspiracy statute for prosecuting
corruption. To what extent United States attorneys can prove that joint acts
of corruption defraud the United States government, however, remains to be
seen.
Apart from this conspiracy theory, however, part four of Justice Stevens'
dissent contained two alternative theories under which mail fraud prosecu-
tions of corrupt officials might continue after McNally.2 65 The majority
neither responded to, nor deflected, either theory. Under Justice Stevens'
first approach,2 66 a public servant's breach of duty is attended by a financial
loss to his employer, who is not getting what he paid for.267 Justice Stevens'
second proposition was that a tangible benefit to the disloyal fiduciary may
exist, under general agency principles, where the fiduciary receives proceeds
as a result of his breach of duty and does not forward them to his em-
ployer.2 6 ' Thus, Justice Stevens suggested that federal prosecutors might
still meet the majority's "money or property" requirement in cases that pre-
viously would have been presented under the intangible rights theory, such
as those involving kickback schemes.269
So far, at least two federal circuits have expressed acceptance of Justice
Stevens' agency theory of mail fraud.27 ° In another circuit, however, a dis-
trict court preserved a large scale mail fraud prosecution of several public
servants without recourse to rules of agency.27 ' Without a doubt, prosecu-
263. In this regard, see United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 876 (D. Md. 1987)
(vacating mail fraud and related RICO convictions in light of McNally).
264. See supra note 202.
265. See United States v. McNally, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 n.10 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing, joined by O'Connor, J., in parts one and three only).
266. Id. at 2882.
267. Id. at 2890 n.10.
268. Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958)).
269. Id.
270. Accord United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1186-88 (6th Cir. 1987) (union offi-
cial's failure to forward kickback-scheme proceeds to union constituted a property depriva-
tion); see United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1010 n.6 (5th Cir. 1987) (employee's failure to
forward kickback-scheme proceeds to employer constituted a property deprivation).
271. See United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 726, 735 (D. Mass. 1987) (government's
indictment and proof sufficient notwithstanding McNally).
[Vol. 37:851
Mail Fraud
tors will press this agent accountability theory in the future.27 2  At this
point, however, whether the balance of the federal circuits will adopt the
theory also remains to be seen.
IV. CONCLUSION
The McNally majority's conclusion that jury instructions following a mail
fraud trial are erroneous when they fail to require a finding of a property
right deprivation represents a practical compromise. On one hand, the
Court's use of the rule of lenity to deflate an expanding judicially-created
doctrine should give pause to jurists too quick to disregard principles of no-
tice, separation of powers, and federalism in validating novel prosecutorial
theories. On the other hand, the decision leaves open a window through
which carefully pled prosecutions of corrupt fiduciaries may yet pass. In this
way, McNally affirms fundamental constitutional values without completely
foreclosing the possibility of federal prosecutions of corrupt fiduciaries.
The lower federal courts presently are resolving the implications of Mc-
Nally on a case-by-case basis. In the meantime, unless Congress revives the
intangible rights doctrine through legislation, it will remain as the McNally
court left it: a dead letter.
John J. O'Connor
272. In fact, the Supreme Court's recent indirect validation of Justice Stevens' theory, in
the context of an insider trading scheme, see Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321
(1987) (quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 497, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969)), makes it certain that United States attorneys will rely on the theory at
least in mail/securities fraud cases like Carpenter.
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